Staff photo by Galina Osmolovskaya
RECENT PAPERS
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Author: When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). (Links: Replication data 1, Replication data 2, Replication data 3)
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Co-author: The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 2 vols (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007)
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"Lost Decades: Lessons from Post-Independence Latin America for Today’s Africa ,"Africa and Latin America secured their independence from European colonial rule a century and half apart: most of Latin America after 1820 and most of Africa after 1960. Despite the distance in time and space, they share important similarities. In each case independence was followed by political instability, violent conflict and economic stagnation lasting for about a half-century (lost decades). The parallels suggest that Africa might be exiting from a period of post-imperial collapse and entering a period of relative political stability and economic growth, as did Latin America a century and a half earlier, Robert H. Bates John H. Coatsworth Jeffrey G. Williamson (Harvard University).
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"Political Predation and Economic Development," Economic growth occurs as resources are reallocated from the traditional sector to the modern sector, which is more productive. It is also more vulnerable to political predation, however. Political risk can therefore hinder development. We analyze a politico-economic game between citizens and governments, whose type (benevolent or predatory) is unknown to the citizens. In equilibrium, opportunistic governments mix between predation and restraint. As long as restraint is observed, political expectations improve and the economy grows. Once there is predation, the reputation of the current government is ruined and the economy collapses. If citizens are unable to overthrow this government, the collapse is durable. Otherwise, a new government is drawn and the economy can rebound. Equilibrium dynamics are characterized as a Markov chain. Consistent with stylized facts, equilibrium political and economic histories are random, unstable and exhibit long–term divergence. Our theoretical model also generates new empirical implications on the joint dynamics of income inequality, output and political variables.
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"Order, Conflict and Violence," Moving from the theory of the state to the theory of games, this paper anayses the foundations of the state -- and the reasons for state failure in late century Africa. , ed. by Tarek Masoud and Stathis Kalyvas New Haven and London, Yale University Press, forthcoming.
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"Ethnicity,"in Elgar Companion to Development Studies, ed. David Clark, forthcoming..
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